The Recycling Strategy of Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering CSR under the Government’s Reward–Penalty Policy
Huaixi Song,
Quanxi Li (),
Kailing Liu and
Yi Li
Additional contact information
Huaixi Song: School of Business and Management, Jilin University, Changchun 130000, China
Quanxi Li: School of Business and Management, Jilin University, Changchun 130000, China
Kailing Liu: School of Business and Management, Jilin University, Changchun 130000, China
Yi Li: School of Business and Management, Jilin University, Changchun 130000, China
Sustainability, 2022, vol. 14, issue 21, 1-16
Abstract:
A closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) is the process of adding a reverse supply chain to the traditional forward supply chain. It has a positive effect on reducing environmental pollution, and therefore many governments have introduced relevant policies to encourage enterprises to develop CLSCs. Among them, the reward–penalty policy (RPP) for the recovery rate of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) is considered better. At the corporate level, the development of CLSCs can enhance the social responsibility awareness of the enterprise and effectively enhance the corporate image. Therefore, in order to study the decision making and recycling channel selection of CLSCs that consider corporate social responsibility (CSR) under the government’s RPP, this paper constructs a two-stage CLSC, including a manufacturer, a retailer, a third-party recycler, and the government. By adopting the Stackelberg game method, we determine the optimal results of the three models and draw a series of conclusions: (1) when the manufacturer is responsible for recycling WEEE, the profit is the largest, and it shows an increasing trend as the government’s reward–penalty coefficient increases; (2) the manufacturer recycling model enables the manufacturer to obtain the maximum CSR investment level, followed by the third-party recycler recycling model, and the smallest is the retailer recycling model; and (3) the government tends to build third-party recycling agencies, which is conducive to improving the level of contribution to GDP. The conclusion of this paper has certain management inspirations for the decision making of the enterprise and the formulation of government policies.
Keywords: closed-loop supply chain; corporate social responsibility; Stackelberg game; government’s reward–penalty policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/14/21/14228/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/14/21/14228/ (text/html)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:14:y:2022:i:21:p:14228-:d:959187
Access Statistics for this article
Sustainability is currently edited by Ms. Alexandra Wu
More articles in Sustainability from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().