Abundance of Resources and Incentives for Collusion in Fisheries

Juan Rosas-Munoz () and José Antonio Carrillo-Viramontes
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Juan Rosas-Munoz: Departamento de Economía y Finanzas, Universidad del Bío-Bío, Concepcion 4030000, Chile

Sustainability, 2022, vol. 14, issue 22, 1-20

Abstract: The aim of this study is to explore theoretically the circumstances in which collusion can emerge between artisanal organizations and external agents. We also analyze theoretically how collusion can alter the sustainability equilibria of marine resources. In situations of incomplete information where external agents are not aware of the initial stock of resources, we observe how those agents decide whether to accept or reject offers of collusion from artisanal organizations. We find that collusion is more likely to occur when the resource is abundant than when resources are scarce, as in the latter case, the external consultant has to be more careful with the established quota so as not to deplete the resource. Further, we find that organizations are more impatient in proposing collusion when the resources are scarce.

Keywords: collusion; fisheries; TURFs; sustainability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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