A Study on the Incentive Policy of China’s Prefabricated Residential Buildings Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Qiyun Huang, Junwu Wang, Mengwei Ye, Shiman Zhao and Xiang Si
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Qiyun Huang: Engineering Management, School of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430070, China
Junwu Wang: Engineering Management, School of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430070, China
Mengwei Ye: Engineering Management, School of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430070, China
Shiman Zhao: Engineering Management, School of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430070, China
Xiang Si: China Construction Seventh Division South Company, Shenzhen 518000, China

Sustainability, 2022, vol. 14, issue 3, 1-22

Abstract: With prefabricated construction method deemed as an effective way to improve the environmental performance and sustainable development of the building industry, it is inevitably adopted in the scaled residence in the process of residential industrialization. However, the development of prefabricated residential buildings is still immature under the current market economy system, because the stakeholders involved in the process are not yet able to form a good cooperation mechanism and they are more inclined to keep their own interests. As a result, the market share of prefabricated residential buildings is relatively low. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct research on the stakeholders involved. By analyzing their costs and benefits, the reasons that really impede the population of prefabricated residential buildings can be found. In this paper, incremental cost allocation coefficient is introduced, the incremental cost difference under different assembly rates is considered, and the allocation ratio of the incremental cost input of the prefabricated building is analyzed based on game theory. The evolutionary game theory for government and real estate companies is established under the condition of bounded rationality with consumer participation. Then the effectiveness of the game theory is verified using empirical analysis, so as to provide reference for the authorities to promote the large-scale development of prefabricated residential buildings.

Keywords: prefabricated building; incentive policy; evolutionary game model; incremental cost (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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