Multi-Agent Evolutionary Game Model: Corporate Low-Carbon Manufacturing, Chinese Government Supervision, and Public Media Investigation

Jia Xue, Youshi He, Peng Gao, Yin Tang and Hanyang Xu
Additional contact information
Jia Xue: Management College, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, China
Youshi He: Management College, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, China
Peng Gao: Business College, Jiangsu University of Technology, Changzhou 213001, China
Yin Tang: Department of Statistics, Pennsylvania State University, State College, PA 16802, USA
Hanyang Xu: Nari Group Corporation, Nari Research Institute, Nanjing 211106, China

Sustainability, 2022, vol. 14, issue 9, 1-24

Abstract: Government supervision and media investigation play an important role in regulating manufacturing produce mode and reducing carbon emissions. In terms of theoretical implications, this study uses the tripartite evolutionary game model to investigate the dynamic decision-making process of stable strategies among three participating stakeholders: manufacturing enterprises, government regulatory departments, and media survey agencies. The payoff matrix and replicator dynamic functions of three parties are specifically calculated based on the evolutionary game theory. From a lower-carbon economy perspective, the main factors (revenue, subsidy, cost, and loss) that affect the stable strategies of three stakeholders are included in the sensitivity analysis. In terms of practical implications, this paper describes the evolutionary dynamic process of the stability condition using numerical simulation tests, and it proposes the promotion mechanism of four different supervision stages of manufacturing production mode. In the beginning and early stage, strengthened government supervision and active media investigation have a positive effect on reducing the heavy-polluting manufacturer proportion in China. Under this circumstance, the lower cost, in-creased revenue, and added subsidies all motivate firms to adopt the lower-carbon production mode. With the maturity of the supervision platform, public media will gradually reduce their investigations and interventions to the manufacturing business, and finally engage in no-investigation. This paper also demonstrates that lower penalties and subsidies are not related to the optimal strategy among three stakeholders, and the extravagant survey cost will reduce the enthusiasm of public media to investigate manufacturing firms.

Keywords: corporate low-carbon manufacturing; government supervision; public media investigation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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