Analysis of Strategy Selection in Third-Party Governance of Rural Environmental Pollution

Qianwen Wu, Qiangqiang Wang and Yongwu Dai ()
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Qianwen Wu: School of Economics and Management, Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University, Fuzhou 350002, China
Qiangqiang Wang: School of Economics and Management, Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University, Fuzhou 350002, China
Yongwu Dai: School of Economics and Management, Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University, Fuzhou 350002, China

Sustainability, 2023, vol. 15, issue 11, 1-19

Abstract: In the context of increasingly prominent rural environmental problems, the third-party pollution governance model has become an important initiative for the comprehensive governance of rural environmental problems in China. However, the current third-party governance initiatives continue to suffer from governance failures caused by unclear responsibility sharing and opportunistic behavior. To analyze the reasons behind the behavioral choices of the various stakeholders involved in rural environmental third-party governance and to provide policy insights for formulating more reasonable rural environmental third-party governance solutions, a game model was constructed between local governments and third-party governance institutions. Specifically, the model examined the different evolutionary game strategies that appear between local governments and third-party governance institutions in different institutional design contexts when responsibility disputes arise in third-party governance. These disputes involve the re-governing of pollution control responsibility, which can be borne either by the local governments or the party causing the damage. The results shown are as follows: It is crucial to define the boundaries of re-governance responsibility in the third-party governance of rural environmental pollution. When local governments bear the primary responsibility for governance, regardless of whether they provide regulatory oversight, third-party governance institutions tend to adopt a passive approach. In such cases, the third-party governance market fails to effectively fulfill its role in governance. By reconstructing the third-party governance market model and dividing the main responsibility for pollution governance among the damaging parties, it is possible to achieve active governance by third-party governance institutions without the need for regulation by local governments.

Keywords: negative governance; responsibility boundaries; regulation; evolution game; Jacobian matrix (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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