Does Environmental Policy with Veto Power Lead to Heterogeneous Emission? Evidence from China

Yan Fu, Jiaxing Cao, Xiaohui Wu, Jiale He, Zekun Zhou and Yulin Zhao ()
Additional contact information
Yan Fu: College of Public Administration, Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou 310023, China
Jiaxing Cao: School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310023, China
Xiaohui Wu: College of Public Administration, Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou 310023, China
Jiale He: College of Public Administration, Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou 310023, China
Zekun Zhou: College of Public Administration, Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou 310023, China
Yulin Zhao: College of Public Administration, Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou 310023, China

Sustainability, 2023, vol. 15, issue 12, 1-19

Abstract: Under the high-powered target responsibility system since 2007, with newly added environmental criterion, this study seeks to examine the effectiveness of the target-based performance assessment as an accelerator for local officials to be “greener”. This coercive environmental policy incorporates a stringent “one-vote” veto criterion for cadre promotion, meaning that officials who exceed emissions standards will not be promoted, no matter how outstanding their other performances are. Based on a panel data of 106 observations of provincial party secretaries from 31 provinces, this study examines how the target assessment intervenes in pollutant emissions through a new career incentive mode in China, and the conclusions are as follows: (1) Usually, provincial officials with higher political promotion incentives are characterized as a younger, lower-position cadre during the pre-stage of term, and tend to take GDP growth goals as a priority while treating environmental targets negatively. (2) Target assessment moderates the relationship between officials’ position and SO 2 emission. The use of a one-vote veto in environmental pollution assessments has led to a shift of incentive structure, as political actors prioritize environmental protection as a means of increasing their chances of promotion. (3) The moderating effect of target assessment is heterogeneous, being significant only when officials are below 60 or before the third year of their term. This study sheds light on the previously opaque motivations behind green behaviors among officials, and provides empirical support for China’s transition from a GDP-based assessment system to a green GDP-based promotion model.

Keywords: target assessment; promotion incentive; SO 2 emission; official characteristic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/15/12/9163/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/15/12/9163/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:15:y:2023:i:12:p:9163-:d:1164957

Access Statistics for this article

Sustainability is currently edited by Ms. Alexandra Wu

More articles in Sustainability from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().