Developing Platform Supply Chain Contract Coordination and a Numerical Analysis Considering Fresh-Keeping Services
Yong Wang,
Xudong Deng,
Qian Lu (),
Mingke Guan,
Fen Lu and
Xiaochang Wu
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Yong Wang: School of Management, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430065, China
Xudong Deng: School of Management, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430065, China
Qian Lu: Sanya Science and Education Innovation Park of Wuhan University of Technology, Sanya 572000, China
Mingke Guan: School of Management, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430065, China
Fen Lu: School of Management, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430065, China
Xiaochang Wu: School of Management, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430065, China
Sustainability, 2023, vol. 15, issue 18, 1-20
Abstract:
With changes in demand and the emergence of new distribution channels, consumer-centric buyer’s markets for many products have been formed. The platform supply chain has been continuously optimized and upgraded. Supply chain leaders have moved downstream to the end of the supply chain. The operational value has been further enhanced. The corresponding systematic construction of the platform supply chain has become an important driving force for future development. The model in this paper is different from the traditional supply chain contract model, which mainly focuses on suppliers or demand. In order to meet the requirements of fresh-keeping services and the goal of revenue sharing, we integrate the production and circulation characteristics of fresh produce into the design of a contract model. In this paper, a revenue-sharing contract model of the fresh produce supply chain is constructed based on the core position of retailers, the uncertainty of the market size, and the consideration of a fresh-keeping service. The model is mainly composed of the core retailer and the supplier. Through further numerical analysis, we verify the effectiveness of the revenue-sharing contract model in supply chain coordination. We also analyze the change trends in the optimal retail price, optimal freshness level, and optimal order quantity caused by changes in both the fresh-keeping service capacity and the revenue-sharing coefficient. The results show that after changing these two parameters, the supply chain can achieve coordination under the specified parameter values. The changed parameters will also lead to certain change trends in the optimal retail price, optimal freshness level, and optimal order quantity, and will have a corresponding impact on the stability of supply chain operation. This research provides a relevant theoretical and empirical basis for a fresh produce supply chain contract model with retailers at the core position. We also provide guidance and reference for optimizing the supply chain management mode and improving the overall operational efficiency of the fresh produce supply chain.
Keywords: retailer-led platform supply chain; fresh-keeping service; revenue sharing; supply chain contract coordination; numerical analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:15:y:2023:i:18:p:13586-:d:1237664
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