Pricing Decisions for Power Battery Closed-Loop Supply Chains with Low-Carbon Input by Echelon Utilization Enterprises

Nan Xu, Yaoqun Xu () and Haiyan Zhong
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Nan Xu: School of Management, Harbin University of Commerce, Harbin 150028, China
Yaoqun Xu: Institute of System Engineering, Harbin University of Commerce, Harbin 150028, China
Haiyan Zhong: School of Management, Harbin University of Commerce, Harbin 150028, China

Sustainability, 2023, vol. 15, issue 23, 1-30

Abstract: Today, with the number of waste power batteries and consumers’ awareness of low-carbon both increasing, a new closed-loop supply chain model in which the node enterprises of reverse supply chains are being constructed. These are responsible for the recycling, echelon utilization and low-carbon innovation of waste power batteries. This provides a new way for the development of reverse supply chain node enterprises and lays a theoretical foundation. In this paper, we use the backward solution method to solve the Nash equilibrium solution of the Stackelberg game. Through numerical calculation and simulation, the decision variables, profit and income of the supply chain are analyzed and the equilibrium results are compared. The experimental results indicate that the implementation of low-carbon innovative production by cascaded utilization enterprises is conducive to the growth of their profits with lower cost inputs. The impact of the initial waste power battery recycling rate on the decision variables is negative, while, for the supply chain as a whole, the profit growth of the node companies can be positive and the location of the inflection point appears to be particularly important. The sensitivity coefficient of low-carbonization levels has a positive regulatory effect on decision variables and location of all parties. The closed-loop supply chain model proposed in this study promotes the overall development of a power battery closed-loop supply chain, and also provides theoretical guidance for reasonable pricing decisions of node enterprises under the new model. Based on the results of this paper, the government can implement incentives such as subsidies, or formulate reasonable policies for the development of a power battery closed-loop supply chain.

Keywords: closed-loop supply chain; Stackelberg game; low-carbon innovation; recovery rate of power battery; Nash equilibrium solution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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