Coordination Analysis of the Recycling and Remanufacturing Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Consumers’ Low Carbon Preference and Government Subsidy

Yan Chen, Zhuying Wang (), Yan Liu and Zongchao Mou
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Yan Chen: School of Management Engineering, Qingdao University of Technology, Qingdao 266520, China
Zhuying Wang: School of Management Engineering, Qingdao University of Technology, Qingdao 266520, China
Yan Liu: School of Management Engineering, Qingdao University of Technology, Qingdao 266520, China
Zongchao Mou: School of Management Engineering, Qingdao University of Technology, Qingdao 266520, China

Sustainability, 2023, vol. 15, issue 3, 1-24

Abstract: Guided by the goals of carbon peaking and carbon neutrality, in order to coordinate the recycling and remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), considering the strengthened low-carbon awareness of consumers and the high cost of carbon emission reduction(CER), realizing that the demand of remanufactured product is affected by both market price and manufacturer’s CER effort and that the manufacturer is responsible for CER, this study focuses on the hybrid recycling between the manufacturer and retailer. Based on Stackelberg game theory, it constructs the profit models for various interested parties under centralized and decentralized decision-making models to study consumer low carbon preference coefficient and government CER subsidy coefficient, in order to work out the optimal pricing strategy and the level of manufacturer’s CER effort under two decision models, and designs a cost-and-benefit-sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain. The results show that: (1) total recycling amount and total profit under CLSC are negatively correlated with recycling channel competition coefficient; (2) government CER subsidy and consumers’ low carbon preference help enhance both total profit under CLSC and the zeal of manufacturers for CER; and (3) the parameters of contracts in some circumstances contribute to alleviating the competition between manufacturer and retailer cycling channels and increasing the total recycling amount under CLSC. Meanwhile, the profit for various interested parties and total profit under CLSC, and the level of a manufacturer’s CER effort, can be simultaneously improved. Consequently, the Pareto improvement and sustainable development for the CLSC can be achieved.

Keywords: consumers’ low carbon preference; government emissions reduction subsidy; recycling and remanufacturing; closed-loop supply chain (CLSC); Stackelberg game; contract coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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