Coordination Decision-Making for Intelligent Transformation of Logistics Services under Capital Constraint

Guangmei Cao (), Yuesen Wang, Honghu Gao, Hao Liu, Haibin Liu, Zhigang Song and Yuqing Fan
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Guangmei Cao: School of Economics and Management, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, China
Yuesen Wang: School of Econ and Management, Shijiazhuang Tiedao University, Shijiazhuang 100044, China
Honghu Gao: School of Management Engineering, Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics, Zhengzhou 450046, China
Hao Liu: School of Management Engineering, Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics, Zhengzhou 450046, China
Haibin Liu: School of Management Engineering, Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics, Zhengzhou 450046, China
Zhigang Song: School of Management Engineering, Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics, Zhengzhou 450046, China
Yuqing Fan: School of Management Engineering, Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics, Zhengzhou 450046, China

Sustainability, 2023, vol. 15, issue 6, 1-25

Abstract: The intelligent transformation of logistics plays a significant role in meeting the diverse needs of customers, improving operational efficiency, and reducing carbon emissions in logistics activities. Therefore, to achieve sustainable development, logistics enterprises need to face the decision-making problem of intelligent logistics transformation. In this paper, we construct a Stackelberg game model between a financially constrained logistics-service provider (LSP) and a well-funded logistics-service integrator (LSI) and discuss the impact of the wholesale price contract, the cost-sharing contract, the revenue-sharing contract, the two-part tariff contract, and the hybrid cost-sharing and revenue-sharing contract on the intelligence level of logistics services, the profits of supply-chain members, and the channel for logistics-service demand. We found that the cost-sharing contract and the revenue-sharing contract cannot achieve Pareto improvement in the profits of supply-chain members. In addition, the increase in bank-loan interest rates would seriously weaken the level of intelligence and market demand for the entire logistics service. However, when consumers do not have high requirements for the intelligence of logistics services, the two-part power–price contract can create a win–win situation for supply-chain members and increase market demand within a certain range; on the contrary, a hybrid contract of cost sharing and revenue sharing is the best choice. Moreover, in the process of contract design for the intelligent transformation of logistics services, it is necessary to pay attention to the influence of the price-sensitivity coefficient on decision-making.

Keywords: intelligent transformation; logistics service; contract coordination; capital constraint; decision analysis; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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