How to Promote the Development of Cultural and Creative Industries from an Evolutionary Game Perspective: Policy Mechanisms for Certification + Incentives
Yangyang Li,
Jianing Sun,
Juan Chen,
Jinlei Li,
Li Sun () and
Kewang Cao
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Yangyang Li: School of Art, Anhui University of Finance and Economics, Bengbu 230030, China
Jianing Sun: School of Business Administration, Anhui University of Finance and Economics, Bengbu 233030, China
Juan Chen: School of Business Administration, Anhui University of Finance and Economics, Bengbu 233030, China
Jinlei Li: School of Geophysics and Information Technology, China University of Geosciences, Beijing 100083, China
Li Sun: School of Art, Anhui University of Finance and Economics, Bengbu 230030, China
Kewang Cao: School of Art, Anhui University of Finance and Economics, Bengbu 230030, China
Sustainability, 2024, vol. 16, issue 11, 1-38
Abstract:
Existing studies need to pay more attention to the policy mechanisms of how to promote the development of cultural and creative industries through coordinating multi-stakeholder participation. Based on evolutionary game theory, this study constructs a three-party evolutionary game model to analyze the behavioral patterns of the government, cultural and creative enterprises, and consumers under different support policies. In addition, it takes the Chinese intangible cultural heritage of “Huaihe willow weaving” as a typical case for simulation. The results show that the probability of the system converging to the expected equilibrium point is low after implementing the certification policy, but the probability of the system converging to the expected equilibrium is significantly increased after implementing the incentive policy. Producer subsidies have significant advantages over consumer subsidies. At this stage, the government should consider jointly implementing the “certification + incentives” policy in phases to promote the development of cultural and creative industries.
Keywords: cultural and creative industries; policy mechanisms; stakeholders; evolutionary game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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