The Dynamics of Rewards and Penalties: Governmental Impact on Green Packaging Adoption in Logistics

Xingyi Yang, Xiaopei Dai () and Hou Bin
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Xingyi Yang: School of Business, Hunan University of Technology, Zhuzhou 412007, China
Xiaopei Dai: Hunan Key Laboratory of Macroeconomic Big Data Mining and Its Application, School of Business, Hunan Normal University, Changsha 410081, China
Hou Bin: School of Business, Hunan University of Technology, Zhuzhou 412007, China

Sustainability, 2024, vol. 16, issue 11, 1-23

Abstract: The widespread use of traditional packaging materials poses significant environmental challenges. Adopting green packaging is essential for reducing pollution and conserving natural resources. This paper aims to examine the effectiveness of government incentives and penalties in promoting the adoption of green packaging by logistics companies. We developed an evolutionary game theory model that involves governments and logistics companies, comparing the impacts of static and dynamic reward and penalty policies. The results indicate that (1) static policies often lead to oscillatory adoption rates of green packaging without achieving a stable equilibrium, while dynamic policies generally promote steadier adoption of sustainable practices. (2) Different combinations of dynamic policies have varying influences on logistics companies’ propensity to adopt green packaging solutions. Specifically, dynamic rewards and static penalties are particularly effective at encouraging logistics companies to adopt green packaging. (3) A combination of dynamic rewards and penalties tends to facilitate more rapid and consistent adoption of green packaging by logistics companies. (4) An increase in government supervision costs is associated with reduced regulatory actions and a lower prevalence of green packaging. These insights are critical for policymakers aiming to craft regulations that successfully encourage sustainability within logistics operations.

Keywords: green packaging; logistics companies; dynamic policies; evolutionary game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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