Manufacturer’s Channel Strategy and Demand Information Sharing in a Retailer-Led Green Supply Chain

Ruiping Wang, Zhenkai Lou () and Xuming Lou
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Ruiping Wang: School of Economics and Management, Xi’an University of Posts and Telecommunications, Xi’an 710061, China
Zhenkai Lou: School of Management Science and Engineering, Anhui University of Technology, Maanshan 243032, China
Xuming Lou: School of Economics and Management, Xi’an University of Posts and Telecommunications, Xi’an 710061, China

Sustainability, 2024, vol. 16, issue 14, 1-21

Abstract: In the rapidly evolving landscape of e-commerce, companies are increasingly focusing on their channel strategies to gain sustainable development. However, asymmetric demand information poses challenges to these decisions. This paper explores the interplay between a retailer’s information sharing strategy and a manufacturer’s channel strategy in a retailer-led green supply chain, where the manufacturer may establish an online channel to sell its green products directly. The dominant retailer has private demand information about the market and decides whether to share private information with the manufacturer. By establishing a game model, we analyze the impacts of information sharing and the manufacturer’s channel strategy on the payoffs for all the supply chain members, considering sustainability aspects such as the environmental benefits of green products and the efficiency of supply chain operations. The results show that information sharing benefits both the retailer and the manufacturer, irrespective of the establishment of an online channel. When the retailer shares demand information, opening an online channel benefits the manufacturer but benefits the retailer under certain conditions. Furthermore, through a numerical approach, we examine the strategic preferences of the firms and derive the equilibrium strategy. Interestingly, the manufacturer consistently prefers the scenario involving both an online channel and information sharing. The retailer’s preference, however, depends on the direct selling cost; it favors information sharing with or without an online channel based on this cost. Ultimately, our findings suggest that the equilibrium strategy can either be sharing information with an online channel or not sharing information without an online channel, which is contingent upon the direct selling cost and the forecast signal precision. These insights provide actionable strategies for enhancing the sustainability of supply chain operations.

Keywords: green supply chain; channel strategy; information sharing; green product level; signaling game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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