Optimal Bidding Strategies for Wind-Thermal Power Generation Rights Trading: A Game-Theoretic Approach Integrating Carbon Trading and Green Certificate Trading

Meina Shen, Runkun Cheng and Da Liu ()
Additional contact information
Meina Shen: School of Economics, University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 102488, China
Runkun Cheng: School of Economics and Management, North China Electric Power University, Beijing 102206, China
Da Liu: School of Economics and Management, North China Electric Power University, Beijing 102206, China

Sustainability, 2024, vol. 16, issue 16, 1-15

Abstract: In response to the challenges of low wind power consumption and high pollution emissions from thermal power, the implementation of wind-thermal power generation rights trading is a proactive attempt to reduce wind power curtailment and promote its consumption. This study first regards the alternating bidding process between the two parties as a dynamic game, using the Rubinstein bargaining game model to determine the incremental profit allocation and optimal bidding for both parties in power generation rights trading. Secondly, an energy conservation and emission reduction model is constructed to analyze the benefits from the perspectives of standard coal consumption saving and the carbon emission reduction caused by power generation rights trading. Finally, a combined trading revenue model is established to analyze the final profit of both parties involved in the trading. The results show that the combined trading of wind-thermal power generation rights, incorporating carbon trading and green certificate trading, can effectively promote coal consumption savings in thermal power units and reduce the carbon emissions of the power industry. Moreover, it significantly increases the final profit for both parties, stimulating the enthusiasm of generators for participating in power generation rights trading, and ultimately promoting wind power consumption.

Keywords: wind power consumption; carbon emission; generation rights trading; carbon trading; green certificate trading; Rubinstein bargaining game model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/16/16/6739/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/16/16/6739/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:16:y:2024:i:16:p:6739-:d:1451185

Access Statistics for this article

Sustainability is currently edited by Ms. Alexandra Wu

More articles in Sustainability from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().