Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government Regulation on Green Innovation Behavior Decision-Making of Energy Enterprises

Gedi Ji, Qisheng Wang, Qing Chang, Yu Fang, Jianglin Bi and Ming Chen ()
Additional contact information
Gedi Ji: School of Economics and Management, Inner Mongolia University of Technology, Hohhot 010051, China
Qisheng Wang: School of Economics and Management, Inner Mongolia University of Technology, Hohhot 010051, China
Qing Chang: School of Economics and Management, Inner Mongolia University of Technology, Hohhot 010051, China
Yu Fang: Faculty of Management and Economics, Kunming University of Science and Technology, 727 Jingming South Road, Kunming 650500, China
Jianglin Bi: School of Economics and Management, Qingdao University of Science and Technology, 99 Songling Road, Qingdao 266061, China
Ming Chen: School of Economics and Management, Qingdao University of Science and Technology, 99 Songling Road, Qingdao 266061, China

Sustainability, 2024, vol. 16, issue 17, 1-18

Abstract: Encouraging environmentally friendly innovation in energy companies is an essential way to stop global warming. Through ingenious integration of reputation and fairness preference, this research develops an evolutionary game model between the government and energy companies. This research investigates the dynamic evolution of green innovation strategy selection by energy firms operating under government supervision, using an evolutionary game model as a basis. This study examines how government regulations, including their subsidies and penalties, reputation, and fairness preference, affect the green innovation behavior of energy enterprises. The research shows that without considering the fairness preference, the subsidy and punishment of government regulation can improve the tendency of energy enterprises to choose green innovation behavior. At the same time, considering the reputation of energy enterprises to assume social responsibility can improve the tendency of energy enterprises to choose green innovation behavior. In the case of considering fairness preference, energy companies with strong fairness preference are more likely not to adopt green innovation and need more subsidies and penalties to choose green innovation; energy enterprises with weak fairness preference are more likely to adopt green innovation; green innovation will take place with fewer subsidies and penalties; reputation plays a stronger role in energy companies with weak fairness preferences. The study can give the government a theoretical foundation on which to build precise regulatory plans for various energy firms and encourage green innovation in those enterprises.

Keywords: fairness preference; evolutionary game; government regulation; green innovation; reputation; energy enterprises (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/16/17/7542/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/16/17/7542/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:16:y:2024:i:17:p:7542-:d:1467998

Access Statistics for this article

Sustainability is currently edited by Ms. Alexandra Wu

More articles in Sustainability from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().