Optimal Decisions in an Authorized Remanufacturing Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Dual-Fairness Concerns

Zichun Deng, Mohd Rizaimy Shaharudin (), S. Sarifah Radiah Shariff and Ming-Lang Tseng
Additional contact information
Zichun Deng: Faculty of Business and Management, Universiti Teknologi MARA, Shah Alam 40450, Malaysia
Mohd Rizaimy Shaharudin: Faculty of Business and Management, Universiti Teknologi MARA, Kedah Branch 08400, Malaysia
S. Sarifah Radiah Shariff: Malaysia Institute of Transport, Universiti Teknologi MARA, Shah Alam 40450, Malaysia
Ming-Lang Tseng: Institute of Innovation and Circular Economy, Asia University, Taichung 413, Taiwan

Sustainability, 2024, vol. 16, issue 17, 1-22

Abstract: This paper studies optimal decisions in an authorized remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, and an authorized third-party remanufacturer with dual-fairness concerns (distributional fairness concerns and peer-induced fairness concerns). Four Stackelberg game models are developed: (i) the dual-fairness concerns are considered by the retailer (model F); (ii) the retailer does not consider both types of fairness concerns (model N); (iii) the retailer only considers the distributional fairness concerns (model D); (iv) the retailer only considers the peer-induced fairness concerns (model P). We use numerical analysis to examine the equilibrium outcomes under dual-fairness concerns. The results show that: (1) The increase in the coefficient of peer-induced fairness concerns will result in more profit for the manufacturer in most cases, while distributional fairness concerns always hurt the manufacturer; (2) In most parameter cases, the increase in the degree of distributional fairness concerns favors the retailer. The retailer considers only peer-induced fairness concerns when the degree of distributional fairness concerns is low and the degree of peer-induced fairness concerns is relatively high, whereas in other cases, two kinds of fairness concerns are ignored; (3) Model P is the most profitable and model D is most disadvantageous for the third party, however, for the manufacturer it is the opposite; (4) The impact of fairness concerns on the environment depends on the retailer’s attitude towards fairness concerns. Model P is the best for the environment, while model D has the highest environmental impact. This study introduces dual-fairness concerns into the authorized remanufacturing CLSC model and provides theoretical references for authorized remanufacturing and sustainability practices.

Keywords: authorized remanufacturing; closed-loop supply chain; distributional fairness concerns; peer-induced fairness concerns (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/16/17/7609/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/16/17/7609/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:16:y:2024:i:17:p:7609-:d:1469898

Access Statistics for this article

Sustainability is currently edited by Ms. Alexandra Wu

More articles in Sustainability from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().