Research on the Green Transition Path of Airport Development under the Mechanism of Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model

Yangyang Lv, Lili Wan, Naizhong Zhang, Zhan Wang (), Yong Tian and Wenjing Ye
Additional contact information
Yangyang Lv: College of Civil Aviation, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 210016, China
Lili Wan: College of Civil Aviation, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 210016, China
Naizhong Zhang: College of Civil Aviation, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 210016, China
Zhan Wang: College of Civil Aviation, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 210016, China
Yong Tian: College of Civil Aviation, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 210016, China
Wenjing Ye: Zhejiang Scientific Research Institute of Transport, Hangzhou 311305, China

Sustainability, 2024, vol. 16, issue 18, 1-28

Abstract: Since existing studies primarily explore green development measures from the static perspective of a single airport stakeholder, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model to analyze the strategic choices of three key stakeholders: airport authorities, third-party organizations, and government departments, based on evolutionary game theory. By solving the stable strategy of the tripartite evolution using the Jacobian matrix, the green transition of airport development can be divided into three stages: “initiation”, “development”, and “maturity”, allowing for the exploration of key factors influencing the green transition of airport development. A simulation analysis is conducted based on real Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport data. The results indicate that the tripartite evolutionary game strategy is stable at E 4 ( 0 , 0 , 1 ) and the green transition of Baiyun Airport remains in the development stage. By improving the reward and punishment mechanisms of government departments, the evolutionary game strategy can be stabilized at E 8 ( 1 , 1 , 1 ) , promoting the green transition of airport development toward the mature stage. By adjusting the game parameters, the dynamic process of green transition in airports at different levels of development and under varying regulatory environments can be effectively captured, supporting the precise formulation of corresponding policies.

Keywords: green airport development; transition path; tripartite evolutionary game; stage division; reward and punishment mechanisms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/16/18/8074/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/16/18/8074/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:16:y:2024:i:18:p:8074-:d:1478867

Access Statistics for this article

Sustainability is currently edited by Ms. Alexandra Wu

More articles in Sustainability from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().