An Evolutionary Stability Study of Zero-Carbon Transition for Shipping Enterprises Considering Dynamic Penalty and Carbon Quota Trading Mechanisms

Zhibo He, Dan Wang, Jiawei Li, Wanwei Fang, Yilin Yang and Mingjun Ji ()
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Zhibo He: Department of Transportation Engineering, Dalian Maritime University, Linghai Road No. 1th, Ganjingzi District, Dalian 116026, China
Dan Wang: National Key Laboratory of Waterway Traffic Control, Shanghai Research Institute of Shipping, 600 Minsheng Road, China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone, Shanghai 200135, China
Jiawei Li: Department of Transportation Engineering, Dalian Maritime University, Linghai Road No. 1th, Ganjingzi District, Dalian 116026, China
Wanwei Fang: Department of Transportation Engineering, Dalian Maritime University, Linghai Road No. 1th, Ganjingzi District, Dalian 116026, China
Yilin Yang: National Key Laboratory of Waterway Traffic Control, Shanghai Research Institute of Shipping, 600 Minsheng Road, China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone, Shanghai 200135, China
Mingjun Ji: Department of Transportation Engineering, Dalian Maritime University, Linghai Road No. 1th, Ganjingzi District, Dalian 116026, China

Sustainability, 2024, vol. 16, issue 23, 1-23

Abstract: The carbon quota trading mechanism is considered one of the most effective incentives for carbon reduction to address global climate change. Currently, the EU has adopted this mechanism to intervene in the zero-carbon transition of shipping companies. Unlike other businesses, the shipping market experiences cyclical changes and high uncertainty, with many factors and complex systems involved in the zero-carbon transition process. Research on the impact of dynamic penalty mechanisms combined with government incentive policies on the zero-carbon transition of shipping companies is relatively scarce. To explore this process under such mechanisms, an evolutionary game model of shipping companies’ zero-carbon transition considering dynamic penalties and carbon quota trading was constructed. The model analyzes the effects of factors such as carbon trading prices, emission reductions resulting from zero-carbon transition, government supervision costs, supervision intensity, subsidy values, and penalty caps on the transition process and performs a simulation analysis. The results indicate the following: (1) Under dynamic penalty mechanisms, the evolutionary trajectories of both government and shipping companies spiral towards a unique evolutionary stable strategy, addressing the shortcomings of static penalty mechanisms. (2) Government supervision costs negatively impact the zero-carbon transition of shipping companies, while supervision intensity has a positive effect. Government subsidies positively affect transition strategies but have a minor impact. Increasing the penalty cap benefits the zero-carbon transition of companies. (3) There is a critical point for carbon trading prices corresponding to changes in zero-carbon transition strategies, providing a basis for companies to decide whether to buy or sell carbon emission trading rights. Additionally, government regulatory changes lag behind the changes in companies’ zero-carbon transition behaviors. The results provide significant insights for government strategy formulation and investment in zero-carbon transition under the carbon quota trading mechanism.

Keywords: carbon quota trading mechanism; dynamic penalties; zero-carbon transition; evolutionary stable strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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