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Greening Service Capacity in Telecom Supply Chain under Environmental Regulation

Ying Shi, Tianjian Yang (), Yu Zhang and Rong Ma
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Ying Shi: China Telecom Research Institute, Guangzhou 510630, China
Tianjian Yang: School of Modern Post (School of Automation), Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, China
Yu Zhang: Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of California, Santa Cruz, CA 95064, USA
Rong Ma: School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, China

Sustainability, 2024, vol. 16, issue 7, 1-19

Abstract: Comprehensive understandings about how to realize service capability greenness in the telecom sector are still rare. In this paper, a non-serial telecom supply chain consisting of an infrastructure supplier, a content provider and a telecom operator is formulated under environmental regulation. The telecom operator aims to find the optimal green procurement ratio between traditional and green equipment. Some common real-life situations are assumed, and the service capacity greenness problems are solved by game theory regarding coordination and interaction among supply chain partners. The results show that the prevailing concern of managers’ “energy saving is not money saving” is the direct reason for a mixed purchase strategy. Further, when diseconomy of purchasing energy-saving equipment reaches a certain threshold, tightening environmental regulation may cause telecom companies to reduce the proportion of energy-saving equipment purchased. Finally, the telecom sector is characterized by its booming service capacity per equipment, which benefits green purchase ratio greatly. When the other six influencing factors are relatively stable, the driving force of telecommunication technology update will push the telecom sector to a greener future.

Keywords: telecom supply chain; service capacity greenness; order allocation; environmental regulation; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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