Consider Demand Response and Power-Sharing Source-Storage-Load Three-Level Game Models

Fuyi Zou, Hui He, Xiang Liao (), Ke Liu, Shuo Ouyang, Li Mo and Wei Huang
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Fuyi Zou: Hubei Key Laboratory for High-Efficiency Utilization of Solar Energy and Operation Control of Energy Storage System, Hubei University of Technology, Wuhan 430068, China
Hui He: Changjiang Engineering Group, Wuhan 430077, China
Xiang Liao: Hubei Key Laboratory for High-Efficiency Utilization of Solar Energy and Operation Control of Energy Storage System, Hubei University of Technology, Wuhan 430068, China
Ke Liu: Hubei Key Laboratory for High-Efficiency Utilization of Solar Energy and Operation Control of Energy Storage System, Hubei University of Technology, Wuhan 430068, China
Shuo Ouyang: Hydrology Bureau of Yangtze River Water Resources Commission, Wuhan 430000, China
Li Mo: School of Civil and Hydraulic Engineering, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, China
Wei Huang: Changjiang Engineering Group, Wuhan 430077, China

Sustainability, 2025, vol. 17, issue 10, 1-28

Abstract: With the increasing connection between integrated natural gas, thermal energy, and electric power systems, the integrated energy system (IES) needs to coordinate the internal unit scheduling and meet the different load demands of customers. However, when the energy subjects involved in scheduling are engaged in conflicts of interest, aspects such as hierarchical status relationships and cooperative and competitive relationships must be considered. Therefore, this paper studies the problem of achieving optimal energy scheduling for multiple subjects of source, storage, and load under the same distribution network while ensuring that their benefits are not impaired. First, this paper establishes a dual master-slave game model with a shared energy storage system (SESS), IES, and the alliance of prosumers (APs) as the main subjects. Second, based on the Nash negotiation theory and considering the sharing of electric energy among prosumers, the APs model is equated into two sub-problems of coalition cost minimization and cooperative benefit distribution to ensure that the coalition members distribute the cooperative benefits equitably. Further, the Stackelberg-Stackelberg-Nash three-layer game model is established, and the dichotomous distributed optimization algorithm combined with the alternating direction multiplier method (ADMM) is used to solve this three-layer game model. Finally, in the simulation results of the arithmetic example, the natural gas consumption is reduced by 9.32%, the economic efficiency of IES is improved by 3.95%, and the comprehensive energy purchase cost of APs is reduced by 12.16%, the proposed model verifies the sustainability co-optimization and mutual benefits of source, storage and load multi-interested subjects.

Keywords: integrated energy systems; X2P; prosumer P2P; stackelberg game; nash bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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