Evolutionary Game Analysis of Multi-Agent Synergistic Incentives Driving Green Energy Market Expansion

Yanping Yang (), Xuan Yu () and Bojun Wang
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Yanping Yang: School of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Jiangsu University of Science and Technology, Zhenjiang 212000, China
Xuan Yu: School of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Jiangsu University of Science and Technology, Zhenjiang 212000, China
Bojun Wang: School of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Jiangsu University of Science and Technology, Zhenjiang 212000, China

Sustainability, 2025, vol. 17, issue 15, 1-20

Abstract: Achieving the construction sector’s dual carbon objectives necessitates scaling green energy adoption in new residential buildings. The current literature critically overlooks four unresolved problems: oversimplified penalty mechanisms, ignoring escalating regulatory costs; static subsidies misaligned with market maturity evolution; systematic exclusion of innovation feedback from energy suppliers; and underexplored behavioral evolution of building owners. This study establishes a government–suppliers–owners evolutionary game framework with dynamically calibrated policies, simulated using MATLAB multi-scenario analysis. Novel findings demonstrate: (1) A dual-threshold penalty effect where excessive fines diminish policy returns due to regulatory costs, requiring dynamic calibration distinct from fixed-penalty approaches; (2) Market-maturity-phased subsidies increasing owner adoption probability by 30% through staged progression; (3) Energy suppliers’ cost-reducing innovations as pivotal feedback drivers resolving coordination failures, overlooked in prior tripartite models; (4) Owners’ adoption motivation shifts from short-term economic incentives to environmentally driven decisions under policy guidance. The framework resolves these gaps through integrated dynamic mechanisms, providing policymakers with evidence-based regulatory thresholds, energy suppliers with cost-reduction targets, and academia with replicable modeling tools.

Keywords: green energy promotion; synergistic incentives; new residential building; policy dynamic calibration; evolutionary game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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