Analysis of Water Rights Allocation in Heilongjiang Province Based on Stackelberg Game Model and Entropy Right Method

Kaiming Lu, Shang Yang, Zhilei Wu and Zhenjiang Si ()
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Kaiming Lu: College of Heilongjiang River and Lake Chief, Heilongjiang University, Harbin 150080, China
Shang Yang: College of Heilongjiang River and Lake Chief, Heilongjiang University, Harbin 150080, China
Zhilei Wu: College of Heilongjiang River and Lake Chief, Heilongjiang University, Harbin 150080, China
Zhenjiang Si: College of Heilongjiang River and Lake Chief, Heilongjiang University, Harbin 150080, China

Sustainability, 2025, vol. 17, issue 16, 1-23

Abstract: This study compares the Stackelberg game model and the entropy weight method for allocating intercity water rights in Heilongjiang Province (2014–2021). The entropy method objectively determines indicator weights, while the Stackelberg framework simulates leader–follower interactions between the water authority and users to balance efficiency and satisfaction. Under the same total water rights cap, the Stackelberg scheme achieves a comprehensive benefit of CNY 14,966 billion, 4% higher than the entropy method (CNY 14,436 billion). The results and comprehensive benefits of the two schemes are close to each other in the cities of Qiqihaer, Daqing, Hegang, etc., but the allocation method of the game theory is more in line with the practical needs and can meet the water demand of each region, and the entropy right method is more useful for the cities of Jiamusi, Jixi, and Heihe, while for other cities the water rights allocation appeared to be unreasonable. While the entropy approach is transparent and data-driven, it lacks dynamic feedback and may under- or over-allocate in rapidly changing contexts. The Stackelberg model adapts to varying demands, better aligning allocations with actual needs. We discuss parameter justification, sensitivity, governance assumptions, and potential extensions, including hybrid modeling, climate change integration, stakeholder participation, and real-time monitoring. The findings provide methodological insights for adaptive and equitable water allocation in regions with strong regulatory capacity.

Keywords: Stackelberg game; entropy rights method; water rights allocation; water resources (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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