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How Does Moderate Supervision Curb Elite Capture? Lessons from China’s Sustainable Water Governance

Li Li, Linli Li, Qian Li and Ashfaq Ahmad Shah ()
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Li Li: College of Humanities and Development Studies, China Agricultural University, Beijing 100083, China
Linli Li: College of Humanities and Development Studies, China Agricultural University, Beijing 100083, China
Qian Li: Engineering Department of Yantai Water Diversion Center, Yantai 264000, China
Ashfaq Ahmad Shah: College of Humanities and Development Studies, China Agricultural University, Beijing 100083, China

Sustainability, 2025, vol. 17, issue 21, 1-23

Abstract: Elite capture, a power structure problem involving rent-seeking, hinders sustainable water resources management. Governments play crucial roles in instilling public legitimacy in water governance, a common-pool resource that benefits from cooperative solutions such as pilot competitions, co-monitoring, and inter-agency coordination. A study of South-to-North Water Diversion Projects in China showed how, when governments outsource small projects to local sub-contractors, a method named moderate supervision ( ruo jiandu ) can enable effective oversight, which is superior to a bidding model with strict supervision ( qiang jiandu ). The concept of moderate supervision was initiated in 2023, before which most small projects had been left in a risky state with no supervision ( ling jiandu ). Analysis of a case in Shandong Yellow River Water Diversion Irrigation Area involved semi-structured in-depth interviews. Findings revealed that an elite-government-villagers tripartite spiral was composed of 3 dimensions reshaping a positive elite culture: first, a whitelist of qualified local contractors; second, co-monitoring of multiple stakeholders with influence exerted by a three-tier mobilization system; third, inter-agency coordination innovatively enabling smooth functioning between policy entrepreneurs of formal institutions and local social governance of informal ones. Policy implications to underscore real-world applicability are provided.

Keywords: moderate supervision; common pool resources (CPRs); elite capture; sustainable water management; development effectiveness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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