Tripartite Evolutionary Game for Carbon Reduction in Highway Service Areas: Evidence from Xinjiang, China

Huiru Bai and Dianwei Qi ()
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Huiru Bai: College of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Xinjiang University, Urumqi 830000, China
Dianwei Qi: College of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Xinjiang University, Urumqi 830000, China

Sustainability, 2025, vol. 17, issue 22, 1-40

Abstract: This study focuses on highway service areas. Building upon prior research that identified key influencing factors through surveys and ISM–MICMAC analysis, it constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, service area operators, and carbon reduction technology providers based on stakeholder theory. Combined with MATLAB simulations, the model reveals the dynamic patterns of the carbon reduction system. The results indicate that government strategies exert the strongest influence on the system and catalyze the other two parties, followed by service area operators. Carbon reduction technology providers adopt a more cautious stance in decision-making. Government actions shape system evolution through a “cost-benefit-incentive” triple mechanism, with its strategies exhibiting significant spillover effects on other actors. Enterprise behavior is markedly influenced by Xinjiang’s regional characteristics, where the core barriers to corporate carbon reduction lie in the costs of proactive equipment and technological investments. The willingness of technology providers to cooperate primarily depends on two drivers: incremental baseline benefits and enhanced economies of scale. The core trade-off in government decision-making lies between the cost of strong regulation (Cg1) and the cost of environmental governance under weak regulation (Cg2). An increase in Cg1 prolongs the government’s convergence time by 233.3% and indirectly suppresses the willingness of enterprises and technology providers due to weakened subsidy capacity. Enterprises are relatively sensitive to the investment costs of carbon reduction equipment and technology, with convergence time extending by 120%. Technology providers are highly sensitive to incremental baseline returns (Rt), with stabilization time extending by 500%. Compared to existing research, this model quantitatively reveals the “cost-benefit-incentive” triple transmission mechanism for carbon reduction coordination in “grid-end” regions, identifying key parameters for strategic shifts among stakeholders. Based on this, corresponding policy recommendations are provided for all three parties, offering precise and actionable directions for the sustainable advancement of carbon reduction efforts in service areas. The research conclusions can provide a replicable collaborative framework for decarbonizing transportation infra-structure in grid-end regions with high clean energy endowments.

Keywords: carbon reduction at highway service areas; evolutionary game theory; stakeholder behavior; MATLAB simulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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