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Policy Synergy for Conflicting Interests in Low-Carbon Innovation: An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Dynamic Incentives and Risk-Sharing in China’s Urban Renewal

Yang Zhang, Zexiao Lu () and Wei Zhang
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Yang Zhang: School of Management, Xi’an University of Architecture and Technology, Beilin District, Xi’an 710055, China
Zexiao Lu: School of Management, Xi’an University of Architecture and Technology, Beilin District, Xi’an 710055, China
Wei Zhang: School of Architecture, Xi’an University of Architecture and Technology, Beilin District, Xi’an 710055, China

Sustainability, 2025, vol. 17, issue 22, 1-26

Abstract: Amidst the challenges posed by global climate change and China’s dual-carbon objectives, the advancement of low-carbon innovative development within urban renewal projects faces obstacles arising from the divergent interests of multiple stakeholders. This research identifies the government, social capital entities, and design research institutes as principal stakeholders and develops a tripartite evolutionary game model incorporating sixteen critical variables. The findings indicate that governmental incentive policies facilitate the system’s progression toward a stable equilibrium. Notably, when the intensity of incentives surpasses a specific threshold, a positive feedback mechanism emerges between social capital engagement and design quality. Consequently, the study proposes a collaborative framework characterized by “dynamic incentives, risk sharing, and mutual recognition of standards,” which underscores the co-evolutionary dynamics among system design, technological innovation, and market participation. This framework offers a novel approach to addressing prevalent challenges in urban renewal, including inadequate incentives, elevated risks, and low efficiency in outcome conversion.

Keywords: urban renewal; low-carbon innovative society; social network analysis; evolutionary game; numerical simulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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