Research on Stochastic Evolution Game of Green Technology Innovation Alliance of Government, Industry, University, and Research with Fuzzy Income

Qing Zhong, Haiyang Cui (), Mei Yang and Cheng Ling
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Qing Zhong: School of Ethnology and History, Guizhou Minzu University, Guiyang 550025, China
Haiyang Cui: School of Ethnology and History, Guizhou Minzu University, Guiyang 550025, China
Mei Yang: School of Mathematics and Statistics, Guizhou University, Guiyang 550025, China
Cheng Ling: School of Economics, Guizhou University, Guiyang 550025, China

Sustainability, 2025, vol. 17, issue 5, 1-21

Abstract: At present, the high complexity of the environment, the uncertainty of income, and the choice of strategies have attracted extensive attention from all walks of life who are committed to studying the game of collaborative innovation between government and industry–university–research. Based on this, first of all, with the help of stochastic evolutionary game theory and fuzzy theory, this paper constructs a multi-party stochastic evolutionary game model of green technology innovation about the government guidelines and the joint promotion of industry, universities, and research institutes. Secondly, it discusses the evolution law of behavior strategies of each game subject and the main factors to maintain the alliance’s stability under fuzzy income. The numerical simulation results show the following: (1) Reputation gains have a significant positive correlation with the evolution stability of alliance behavior, and the incorporation of reputation gains or losses will effectively maintain the cooperation stability of the alliance. (2) Under the influence of product greenness, government subsidies, and long-term benefits, it will promote the pace consistency of cooperative decision-making between industry, universities, and research institutes, and accelerate the evolution of alliances. (3) The enterprise’s ability and the research party’s ability will restrict each other. When one party’s ability is low, its willingness to choose a cooperation strategy may be slightly low due to technology spillover and other reasons. When the two parties’ abilities match, their behavior strategies will increase their willingness to cooperate with their abilities. Compared with the traditional evolutionary game, this study fully considers the uncertainty of the environment and provides theoretical support and practical guidance for the high-quality development strategy of the industry–university–research green technology innovation alliance.

Keywords: stochastic evolutionary game; fuzzy theory; green technology innovation; reputation income; alliance stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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