Sustainable Development Pathways for China’s Copper Industry: A Three-Way Evolutionary Game Approach

Chen Wang, Jinfen Huo, Fenghao Zhang, Wanying Lin, Yinglun Zhao, Youfei Ma, Xuan Shi, Yunfei Ma, Han Yu () and Yan Lin ()
Additional contact information
Chen Wang: College of Environmental Science and Engineering, Nankai University, Tianjin 300350, China
Jinfen Huo: College of Environmental Science and Engineering, Nankai University, Tianjin 300350, China
Fenghao Zhang: College of Environmental Science and Engineering, Nankai University, Tianjin 300350, China
Wanying Lin: College of Environmental Science and Engineering, Nankai University, Tianjin 300350, China
Yinglun Zhao: College of Environmental Science and Engineering, Nankai University, Tianjin 300350, China
Youfei Ma: College of Environmental Science and Engineering, Nankai University, Tianjin 300350, China
Xuan Shi: College of Environmental Science and Engineering, Nankai University, Tianjin 300350, China
Yunfei Ma: College of Environmental Science and Engineering, Nankai University, Tianjin 300350, China
Han Yu: Shenzhen Research Institute, Nankai University, Shenzhen 518063, China
Yan Lin: College of Environmental Science and Engineering, Nankai University, Tianjin 300350, China

Sustainability, 2025, vol. 17, issue 7, 1-18

Abstract: Sustainable development is a tripartite game among the central (CG) and local governments (LGs) and enterprises, with economic factors as key drivers. China consumed about 16.2 million metric tons during this period, accounting for approximately 61% of global consumption, thereby reinforcing its position as the world’s leading copper consumer. Seeking a balance of acceptable interests among the three parties may be a feasible method to explore the sustainable development of China’s copper enterprises (CEs). Therefore, based on evolutionary game theory, we construct a three-party evolutionary game model. Using the financial data of Chinese CEs and actual survey data on the CG and LGs, we identified 31 environmental impact parameters from the CG, LGs, and CEs. Then, we used MATLAB R2023b to simulate an evolution model and determined the influence of various factors on the evolutionary stable state. The results show that LGs, as local managers, have implemented more direct and expedited regulations than the CG. Enterprises with less brand impact frequently face difficulties in complying with governmental regulatory demands. When interests are balanced, 30% of enterprises cannot meet standards within 40 months, which may cause 500 small and medium-sized enterprises to stop production, thus resulting in high unemployment costs for LGs. A scenario analysis evaluates the economic benefits of environmental measures based on evolutionary game results. The results show that the introduction of advanced hydrometallurgy technology has the highest economic benefits; after 5 years, the economic benefits of China’s entire copper industry will reach CNY 147.2 billion.

Keywords: China’s copper industry; evolutionary models; environmental policy; cleaner production; sustainable development (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/17/7/2838/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/17/7/2838/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:17:y:2025:i:7:p:2838-:d:1618390

Access Statistics for this article

Sustainability is currently edited by Ms. Alexandra Wu

More articles in Sustainability from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().