Monitoring Strategy of Air Pollution Emission from Ships in Urban Port Areas Based on Supervisory Game Analysis
Ching-Kuei Kao () and
Dao-Lin Zheng
Additional contact information
Ching-Kuei Kao: Key Laboratory of LNG Industry Chain, School of Transportation, Fujian University of Technology, Fuzhou 350118, China
Dao-Lin Zheng: Department of Logistics Management, School of Transportation, Fujian University of Technology, Fuzhou 350118, China
Sustainability, 2025, vol. 17, issue 9, 1-23
Abstract:
In response to the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) 2020 sulfur cap and China’s stricter emission control policies, this study investigates the strategic interaction between port authorities and shipowners concerning air pollution emissions from ships in port areas. Using supervisory game theory, we construct a model that captures the cost–benefit trade-offs between inspection efforts by regulators and compliance behavior by ship operators. Empirical data from Guangzhou Port in 2020—including government inspection costs, fuel substitution costs, subsidy schemes, and fine levels—are incorporated into the model to simulate equilibrium outcomes. Results indicate that while the current level of inspection has a significant deterrent effect, the probability of full compliance remains low at 34.36%, highlighting the importance of a balanced regulatory approach combining inspection, fines, and subsidies. Policy implications suggest that increased financial incentives and stronger penalties can reduce both regulatory costs and non-compliance risks. This study contributes to the literature on maritime environmental governance by providing a quantitative supervisory framework grounded in real-world port data.
Keywords: air pollution; sulfur cap; supervision game model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/17/9/3822/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/17/9/3822/ (text/html)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:17:y:2025:i:9:p:3822-:d:1641052
Access Statistics for this article
Sustainability is currently edited by Ms. Alexandra Wu
More articles in Sustainability from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().