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How to Promote the Formation of Market-Based Mechanisms for Mine Water Recycling and Utilization in China? A Four-Party Evolutionary Game Analysis

Bing Wang, Jiwei Zhu (), Jiancang Xie and Liu Yang
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Bing Wang: State Key Laboratory of Water Engineering Ecology and Environment in Arid Area, Xi’an University of Technology, Xi’an 710048, China
Jiwei Zhu: State Key Laboratory of Water Engineering Ecology and Environment in Arid Area, Xi’an University of Technology, Xi’an 710048, China
Jiancang Xie: State Key Laboratory of Water Engineering Ecology and Environment in Arid Area, Xi’an University of Technology, Xi’an 710048, China
Liu Yang: State Key Laboratory of Water Engineering Ecology and Environment in Arid Area, Xi’an University of Technology, Xi’an 710048, China

Sustainability, 2025, vol. 17, issue 9, 1-36

Abstract: Mine water is both wastewater and a valuable unconventional water resource, and its recycling is crucial for the sustainable development of coal-resource-based cities. In response to the complex interactions among multiple stakeholders in the process of mine water recycling, this study innovatively develops a four-party evolutionary game model involving local government, coal mining enterprises, mine water operators, and water users. For the first time, key variables—mine water pricing, water volume, water rights trading, water resource taxation, and objective utility of water resources—are systematically integrated into a multi-agent game framework, extending the analysis beyond conventional policies, such as penalties and subsidies, to explore their impact on recycling behavior. The results show the following: (1) There are 10 possible evolutionary stabilization strategies in the system. The current optimal strategy includes supply, input, use, active support, while the ideal strategy under the market mechanism includes supply, input, use, passive support. (2) Local governments play a leading role in collaborative governance. The decisions of coal mining enterprises and mine water operators are highly interdependent, and these upstream actors significantly influence the water users’ strategies. (3) Government subsidies exhibit an inverted U-shaped effect, while punitive measures are more effective than incentives. The tax differential between recycled and discharged mine water incentivizes coal enterprises to adopt proactive measures, and water rights trading significantly enhances the users’ willingness. (4) Mine water should be priced significantly lower than fresh water and reasonably balanced between stakeholders. Industries with lower objective utility of water tend to prioritize its use. This study provides theoretical support for policy optimization and a market-based resource utilization of mine water.

Keywords: mine water; recycling and utilization; market-based mechanism; four-party evolutionary game model; evolutionarily stable strategy; influencing factors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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