Research on the Random Evolutionary Game of the Green Technology Innovation Alliance for Media Monitoring

Qing Zhong, Haiyang Cui (), Mei Yang, Ling Cheng, Liuhua Fang and Qianhui Sun
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Qing Zhong: School of Ethnology and History, Guizhou Minzu University, Guiyang 550025, China
Haiyang Cui: School of Ethnology and History, Guizhou Minzu University, Guiyang 550025, China
Mei Yang: School of Mathematics and Statistics, Guizhou University, Guiyang 550025, China
Ling Cheng: School of Economics, Guizhou University, Guiyang 550025, China
Liuhua Fang: School of Economics, Guizhou University, Guiyang 550025, China
Qianhui Sun: Yangming College, Guizhou University, Guiyang 550025, China

Sustainability, 2025, vol. 17, issue 9, 1-25

Abstract: In the new media era, the green technology alliance with multi-participation has emerged as a powerful contributor to achieving the strategic goal of a green economy. Therefore, this paper constructs a stochastic evolutionary game model of green technology innovation led by the government under an uncertain environment and jointly promoted by enterprises, universities, and research institutes. Then, this study firstly explores the influence of different factors on evolutionary equilibrium and secondly discusses the role of main factors on the behavior strategies of each game subject. Furthermore, numerical simulation analysis using Matlab R2019a 9.6 will be used to prove the model’s validity. The research has shown (1) that media monitoring positively impacts the stability of the alliance and that product greenness can further accelerate alliance evolution when media monitoring is in place. When this factor is small, it will lead to the transformation of Industry-University-Research’s (IUR) optimal strategy into non-cooperation in the early stage. (2) The green degree of products positively affects the decision-making choice of the IUR, but it is not the case for the government. And the role of media supervision will further coordinate its influence and accelerate the evolution of alliances. (3) The enhancement of media monitoring capacity can encourage game subjects to evolve in a more beneficial way. In addition, the implementation of media supervision will help reduce the cost of government supervision and provide reputation benefits. The research fully accounts for the complexity and variability of the environment, and the results provide theoretical support and practical advice for the high-quality development of the green technology innovation alliance.

Keywords: stochastic evolutionary game; green technology innovation; media monitoring capacity; coalition stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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