Why Does Environmental Policy in Representative Democracies Tend to Be Inadequate? A Preliminary Public Choice Analysis

Andrea Kollmann and Friedrich Schneider ()
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Andrea Kollmann: Energy Institute, Johannes Kepler University, Linz, Altenberger Straße 69, 4040 Linz, Austria

Sustainability, 2010, vol. 2, issue 12, 1-25

Abstract: There is a widespread consensus among the most important players in developed countries (voters, politicians, producers, traditional and green interest groups and bureaucracies) that a shift towards an eco-social market economy is essential for sustainable growth. Nevertheless, market-based instruments have not as yet been implemented satisfactorily in environmental policy. To identify the reasons for this insufficient implementation over the past decade, the Public Choice theory is used. The players’ behavior is analyzed in order to show that their incentives for implementing market-based instruments in environmental policy, instead of command-and-control measures, are surprisingly weak. Knowing the obstacles to implementing market-based instruments provides valuable insight into how to overcome them.

Keywords: public choice and environmental policies; sustainability; voters; government; interest groups; tradable permits; green taxes [D23, D62, D72, D73, H23, Q57, Q58] (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Working Paper: Why does Environmental Policy in Representative Democracies Tend to be Inadequate? A Preliminary Public Choice Analysis (2010)
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