La teoria dell'implementazione: introduzione e rassegna critica

Sandro Brusco

Giornale degli Economisti, 1997, vol. 56, issue 1-2, 99-138

Abstract: The paper surveys existing results on implementation. The implementation problem refers to the design of mechanisms having the desired outcome as the unique equilibrium outcome. We shall explain the difference between weak and strong implementation, and then present characterization results on the class of implementable social choice functions for various equilibrium concepts.

Keywords: implementazione; disegno di meccasnismi; decisioni collettive (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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