The Political Economy of Fiscal and Monetary Unions

Federico Etro ()

Giornale degli Economisti, 2004, vol. 63, issue 3-4, 289-328

Abstract: I study the political economy of fiscal unions, where the provision of public goods with spillovers across heterogeneous countries is coordinated, and of monetary unions, where monetary policy is delegated to a supranational authority by countries subject to different shocks. The focus is on the impact of institutional organizations on the size and scope of unions. I provide new results of comparative politics on alternative hierarchies between national and supranational governments choosing on public spending and redistribution, strategic delegation of policymakers under representative democracy and on the role of macroeconomic interdependence in monetary unions.

Keywords: Political Economy; Fiscal Federalism; Monetary Unions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 E6 F0 H1 H4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
ftp://ftp.gde.unibocconi.it/gde_articles/2004/GDE_V63_N3-4_P289-328.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gde:journl:gde_v63_n3-4_p289-328

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.gde.unibocconi.it

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Giornale degli Economisti from GDE (Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia), Bocconi University via Sarfatti, 25 - 20136 Milano (Italy).
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Erika Somma ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).