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CEO Turnover in the Italian Financial Market

Emilio Barucci (), Carlo Bianchi () and Mirko Frediani
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Emilio Barucci: Department of Mathematics, Politecnico di Milano
Mirko Frediani: University of Pisa

Giornale degli Economisti, 2006, vol. 65, issue 2, 127-154

Abstract: We investigate ceo turnover in the Italian financial market analyzing a dataset covering the period 1992-2003 for all listed companies. The likelihood of ceo turnover is higher for poorly performing companies, unless the company is controlled by a family. Managers’ entrenchment is observed: managers holding shares of the company are less likely to lose their job. Ownership composition plays a relevant role: turnover is more likely when the largest shareholder holds a large stake or a small stake; outside blockholders and institutional investors do not affect it. A weak internal governance is associated with a low turnover rate. It seems that recent innovations on financial market regulation are associated with a lower ceo turnover rate with no effect on the ceo turnover-performance relation.

Keywords: CEO turnover; performance; Italian financial market; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G15 G34 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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