 MATTHEW EFFECTS AND R&D SUBSIDIES: KNOWLEDGE CUMULABILITY IN HIGH-TECH AND LOW-TECH INDUSTRIESCristiano Antonelli and Francesco Crespi Giornale degli Economisti, 2012, vol. 71, issue 1, 5-31 Abstract: The paper explores the causes and effects of persistence in the discretionary allocation of public subsidies to R&D activities performed by private firms in high-tech and low-tech industries. It applies the distinction between vicious Matthew-effect and virtuous Matthew-effect. The former qualifies the persistence in the discretionary allocation of public subsidies in terms of sheer reputation based upon previous awards. The latter is identified by the role of the accumulation of competence stemming from past grants in current R&D activities. Virtuous Matthew effects are found in high-tech industries where knowledge cumulability is higher. In traditional industries, vicious Matthew effects prevail for the lower levels of knowledge cumulability. Here reputation-Matthew-effects can lead to substitution of private funds with public ones. Keywords: INNOVATION; R&D SUBSIDIES; MATTHEW EFFECTS; PAST DEPENDENCE; PATH DEPENDENCE (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gde:journl:gde_v71_n1_p5-31 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article More articles in Giornale degli Economisti from GDE (Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia), Bocconi University via Sarfatti, 25 - 20136 Milano (Italy). |
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