Doctor-Nurse Teams, Incentives and Behavior

Aida Isabel Tavares

Notas Económicas, 2014, issue 39, 9-35

Abstract: Nurses have been gaining expertise over time and it is common that they work together in a team with doctors to treat patients. Using a model based on contract theory, the aim of this article is to analyze the effects of an improvement in nurses’ productivity on the incentives paid and on the behavior of doctors and nurses, in particular when the budgets are limited. The results show that following an improvement in nurse productivity, nurses’ incentives are lower but the overall budget of incentives is higher. Under a restricted health care budget, results show that the treatment of patients is mainly carried out by nurses, and not doctors, reflecting free-riding by doctors. The contribution of this work is particularly relevant for human resources policy makers in primary health-care units.

JEL-codes: D82 I19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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