 Economics of hatredInternational Journal of Development and Conflict, 2012, vol. 2, issue 1, 1250005 Abstract: In early and important pieces of work, Edward Glaeser and his co-authors established that hatred responds to the incentives of both suppliers and consumers of hatred. The focus of the above strand of work is a political market in which self-seeking politicians spread hatred amongst voters for electoral motives wherefrom the supply of and demand for hatred are derived. In contrast, we model hatred between rival groups who create hatred against each other for purely economic motives such that hatred inflicts a cost upon all. In the proposed model, we are able to characterize two equilibria: first, there is a stable hatred-free equilibrium only under a very special condition. Secondly, there is also an unstable and high-hatred-equilibrium. The paper examines the implications of the multiplicity of equilibria, their existence and stability properties wherefrom we explain the economic foundation of hatred and its epidemic-like properties. Keywords: Economic contest; symmetric Nash equilibria; stability of fixed points; virtuous trap (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gok:ijdcv1:v:2:y:2012:i:1:p:1250005 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article International Journal of Development and Conflict is currently edited by Partha Gangopadhyay More articles in International Journal of Development and Conflict from Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics Contact information at EDIRC. |
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