Civil conflict & its quasi criminal status: some new insights

Partha Gangopadhyay

International Journal of Development and Conflict, 2012, vol. 2, issue 2, 1250010

Abstract: This paper develops a game-theoretic framework to examine civil conflict arising from predation. From activities of predation, or appropriation, and protection we highlight the optimal choices of a benevolent dictator, or government, at the core and a self-seeking rebel group at the periphery in terms of their arms spending, or scales of militancy, when the dictator has already pre-committed the transfers, or gifts, to the periphery. In the Cournot–Nash equilibrium of the proposed game, we make three important contributions to the literature: First, we explain some of the causes of civil conflict hitherto unknown in the literature. Secondly, we are also able to isolate the factors that are responsible for mitigating civil conflict. Finally, we highlight the process of peace-making as a Pareto-improving investment in allocating resources in the context of core-periphery interrelationships.

Keywords: Core-Periphery; Nash equilibrium; Predation; Pareto-improving peace (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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