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Fighting corruption in Bangladesh: a policy proposal

Khondoker Mottaleb () and Tetsushi Sonobe ()

International Journal of Development and Conflict, 2012, vol. 2, issue 3, 1250014

Abstract: Corruption is widespread in Bangladesh. According to a report of the international watchdog Transparency International, during 2001–2005, Bangladesh was the most corrupt country in the world. How to combat corruption in Bangladesh is now an important agenda for both international donor agencies and the government. Using game theory, this paper proposes that a successful reduction in corruption to a tolerable level in the government sector depends on a reduction in both incentives to and opportunities for corruption by government employees, and this can be done by raising salaries and introducing strong punishment simultaneously. To introduce an effective and strong punishment system, independent, and strong anti-corruption bodies and strong commitment from political leaders are the essential conditions.

Keywords: Corruption; salary; punishment; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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