The Effect of Punitive Sanctions on the Transition Rate from Welfare to Work: Evidence from Denmark

Atef Qureshi (ategu@fm.dk)
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Atef Qureshi: Finansministeriet

Nationaløkonomisk tidsskrift, 2013, vol. 2013, issue 2, 225-246

Abstract: Applying a mixed proportional hazard timing-of-events model in the confines of a search model punitive sanctions are in the current study found to have positive effect on the transition rate from welfare to work. Furthermore, the empirical analysis of this paper shows that the magnitude of this positive effect depends on the type of sanction. This effect diminishes over time and is heterogeneous. Finally, the existence of alternate »escape routes« from the welfare system, other than employment, does not undermine the positive effect of a sanction.

Keywords: welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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