Bør virksomheder oplyses om sandsynligheden for kontrol?

Lars Hansen and Signe Krarup ()
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Signe Krarup: akf, amternes og kommunernes forskningsinstitut, Postal: Nyropsgade 37, 1602 København V, Danmark

Nationaløkonomisk tidsskrift, 2005, vol. 2005, issue 1, 43-64

Abstract: Regulatory authorities often both have limited monitoring budgets and must apply preset punishments resulting in sub-optimal compliance rates. An important task of regulatory authorities is therefore to identify monitoring strategies that maximise compliance under these constraints. The literature often assumes that the monitoring probabilities chosen by authorities are known to firms and that uncertainty reduces welfare. However, looking at areas of monitoring in Denmark, authorities expect the effect of the monitoring to be larger when monitoring probabilities are not disclosed to firms. In this article we analyse the effect on compliance rates of disclosing monitoring probabilities to the regulated firms.

Keywords: Kontrol; offentlig regulering (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:jdaecn:0161

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