Evolutionary Game Analysis of UGC Copyright Infringement Governance

Sen Yang and Fabio Tramontana

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 2024, vol. 2024, 1-13

Abstract: This paper presents an evolutionary game model of the “government-platform-platform user†based on the assumption of bounded rationality. The model explores the copyright governance mechanism of user-generated content (UGC) in China by analyzing the strategic interaction between managers and the managed and the influence of various factors. The findings highlight that the government plays a leading role in the governance mechanism of UGC copyright, and the participation of the platform, as the direct manager of information content, can greatly improve the efficiency of supervision. Increasing government penalties, reducing excess revenue from passive platform filtering, and imposing additional payments for users’ infringing use can expedite the adoption of evolutionary stability strategies. Furthermore, there exists a practical threshold for government incentives for platforms. Therefore, the construction and optimization of the UGC copyright governance mechanism need to be supported by a dynamic and coordinated reward and punishment system, diversified business objectives, and continuously improving users’ copyright awareness.

Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:jnddns:1640909

DOI: 10.1155/2024/1640909

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