Complementary Product Pricing and Service Cooperation Strategy in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain
Minglun Ren,
Jiqiong Liu,
Shuai Feng and
Aifeng Yang
Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 2020, vol. 2020, 1-22
Abstract:
This paper investigates a pricing game and service cooperation for complementary products in a dual-channel supply chain composed of two manufacturers and one retailer. The products of the two manufacturers are complementary products. One manufacturer sells products simultaneously through its own online channel and the traditional retailer, and the manufacturer delivers the product’s service to the retailer in its network direct sales channel by cooperating with the retailer in the form of service cost sharing. Considering the different market power structures of channel members, we establish three different pricing game models. By using the backward induction method and game theory, we obtain the corresponding analytical equilibrium solutions. Then, the service cooperation strategy of using the channel service sensitivity coefficients to construct the weight to share the service cost is proposed. Finally, numerical examples of optimal pricing strategies and profit conditions in different game situations are given, and sensitivity analysis of some key parameters is selectively performed, in which some valuable management insights are obtained.
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:jnddns:2314659
DOI: 10.1155/2020/2314659
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