Analysis of Price Stackelberg Duopoly Game with Bounded Rationality

Lian Shi, Yun Le and Zhaohan Sheng

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 2014, vol. 2014, 1-8

Abstract:

The classical Stackelberg game is extended to boundedly rational price Stackelberg game, and the dynamic duopoly game model is described in detail. By using the theory of bifurcation of dynamical systems, the existence and stability of the equilibrium points of this model are studied. And some comparisons with Bertrand game with bounded rationality are also performed. Stable region, bifurcation diagram, The Largest Lyapunov exponent, strange attractor, and sensitive dependence on initial conditions are used to show complex dynamic behavior. The results of theoretical and numerical analysis show that the stability of the price Stackelberg duopoly game with boundedly rational players is only relevant to the speed of price adjustment of the leader and not relevant to the follower’s. This is different from the classical Cournot and Bertrand duopoly game with bounded rationality. And the speed of price adjustment of the boundedly rational leader has a destabilizing effect on this model.

Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:jnddns:428568

DOI: 10.1155/2014/428568

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