Altruistic Punishment, Status Conflict, and Knowledge Sharing in the Workplace: An Evolutionary Game Model
Fang Song,
Xiwu Hu,
Junfeng Li,
Michael Allen Watson and
Polinpapilinho Katina
Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 2021, vol. 2021, 1-24
Abstract:
Second- and third-party altruistic punishments can both improve knowledge sharing, but it is debatable which does so better. We thus concurrently consider the influence of status conflict advantage and disadvantage on knowledge sharing. We also analyze knowledge sharing by introducing an evolutionary game model and conducting simulations, and reveal the following: (1) the appropriate choice for an organization that is increasing its knowledge contribution is third-party punishment; (2) the status conflict advantage and disadvantage play important roles in knowledge sharing. When the status conflict advantage is greater than the disadvantage, the two players eventually share knowledge, and vice versa. Interestingly, when the status conflict advantage is equal to the disadvantage, the player with the stronger sharing inclination has a powerful impact on the player who would rather hoard knowledge, thus ultimately leading him/her to share. (3) Guanxi, knowledge capacity, and synergy revenue have positive effects on knowledge sharing, while the knowledge sharing cost has a negative influence on them. Moreover, the stable equilibrium result is affected by the initial system state. In sum, our results not only promote the understanding of altruistic punishment and status conflict regarding knowledge sharing but also provide practical implications for both organizations and leaders.
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:jnddns:5551625
DOI: 10.1155/2021/5551625
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