Complexity of a Duopoly Game in the Electricity Market with Delayed Bounded Rationality

Junhai Ma and Hongliang Tu

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 2012, vol. 2012, 1-13

Abstract:

According to a triopoly game model in the electricity market with bounded rational players, a new Cournot duopoly game model with delayed bounded rationality is established. The model is closer to the reality of the electricity market and worth spreading in oligopoly. By using the theory of bifurcations of dynamical systems, local stable region of Nash equilibrium point is obtained. Its complex dynamics is demonstrated by means of the largest Lyapunov exponent, bifurcation diagrams, phase portraits, and fractal dimensions. Since the output adjustment speed parameters are varied, the stability of Nash equilibrium gives rise to complex dynamics such as cycles of higher order and chaos. Furthermore, by using the straight-line stabilization method, the chaos can be eliminated. This paper has an important theoretical and practical significance to the electricity market under the background of developing new energy.

Date: 2012
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/DDNS/2012/698270.pdf (application/pdf)
http://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/DDNS/2012/698270.xml (text/xml)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:jnddns:698270

DOI: 10.1155/2012/698270

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society from Hindawi
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mohamed Abdelhakeem ().