The Optimal PPP Model of Emergency Rescue Service

Cao Guangxi, Ling Zhou and Aihua Li

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 2021, vol. 2021, 1-12

Abstract: Based on the analysis of the shortage of emergency rescue services and the supervision of public-private-partnership (PPP) projects, this paper explores the rent-seeking game predicament and establishes a three-player rent-seeking game model among government regulators, private enterprises, and government agents in the bidding operation of PPP projects by learning from Stackelberg game theory. Through the numerical simulation analysis, this paper explores the impact of the relevant variables on the model results, which can lead to the following conclusions: the emphasis on government regulators changes due to rent-seeking cost changes; when the success rate of verification is high, government regulators can take supervision randomly. Inversely, supervision channels should be broadened when the supervision fails. When the punishment on government agents and private enterprises is great, relaxing supervision may be appropriate. This study proposes the relevant policy recommendations for government regulators to improve their work.

Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:jnddns:8413786

DOI: 10.1155/2021/8413786

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