Coordinating a Supply Chain with a Loss-Averse Retailer under Yield and Demand Uncertainties

Weiwei Luo, Dongguo Shao, Wei Liu and Zhuomin Wang

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 2016, vol. 2016, 1-12

Abstract:

This paper investigates the channel coordination of a supply chain (SC) consisting of a loss-averse retailer and a risk-neutral supplier under yield and demand uncertainties. Three existing contracts are analyzed. Our results demonstrate that the buyback (BB) and quantity flexibility (QF) contracts can not only coordinate the supply chain but also lead to Pareto improvement for each player, while the wholesale price (WP) contract fails to coordinate the chain due to the effects of double marginalization and risk preference. For comparison, a chain with a risk-neutral retailer is also analyzed. Furthermore, numerical examples are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the coordination contracts, and the impacts of loss aversion and random yield on the decision-making behaviors and system performance are then discussed.

Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:jnddns:8928035

DOI: 10.1155/2016/8928035

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