The turnpike property for dynamic discrete time zero-sum games

Alexander J. Zaslavski

Abstract and Applied Analysis, 1999, vol. 4, 1-28

Abstract:

We consider a class of dynamic discrete-time two-player zero-sum games. We show that for a generic cost function and each initial state, there exists a pair of overtaking equilibria strategies over an infinite horizon. We also establish that for a generic cost function f , there exists a pair of stationary equilibria strategies ( x f , y f ) such that each pair of “approximate” equilibria strategies spends almost all of its time in a small neighborhood of ( x f , y f ) .

Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:jnlaaa:174865

DOI: 10.1155/S1085337599000020

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