Optimal Switching Strategy between Admission Control and Pricing Control Policies with Two Types of Customers and Search Costs

Jae-Dong Son

Advances in Operations Research, 2015, vol. 2015, 1-9

Abstract:

This paper presents a switching strategy between the admission control and the pricing control policies in a queueing system with two types of customers. For an arriving first-type customer, the decision maker has an option on which policy to choose between the two control policies; that is, one determines whether or not to admit the customer’s request for the service (admission control) or decides a price of the customer’s request and offers it to the customer (pricing control). The second-type customers are only served when no first-type customers are present in the system in order to prevent the system from being idle. This would yield an extra income, which we refer to as the sideline profit. The so-called search cost, which is a cost paid to search for customers, creates the search option on whether to continue the search or not. We clarify the properties of the optimal switching strategy as well as the optimal search policy in relation to the sideline profit in order to maximize the total expected net profit. In particular, we show that when the sideline profit is sufficiently large, the two optimal switching thresholds exist with respect to the number of first-type customers in the system.

Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:jnlaor:587103

DOI: 10.1155/2015/587103

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